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A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence 
R. Erik Lillquist∗ 
There appears to be little doubt that the law of expert evidence 
has an odd dichotomy.  As Professor Giannelli notes in his 
contribution to this Symposium, courts presently are willing to admit 
forensic evidence, such as fingerprint evidence and hair evidence, 
under circumstances that would not permit the admission of similar 
evidence in a civil case.1  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has failed 
to impose meaningful constitutional constraints on the admissibility 
of prosecutorial expert evidence.2  The result is that defendants in 
civil litigation are more successful in excluding plaintiffs’ expert 
evidence than criminal defendants are in excluding the government’s 
expert evidence.  This seems to be at odds with our fundamental 
presumption that courts should be more, not less, protective of 
criminal defendants than civil defendants. 
In response to the divergent approaches to expert evidence law 
in criminal and civil cases, contributors to this Symposium suggest 
several reforms.  First, Professors Friedman, Giannelli, Denbeaux, 
and Risinger argue that the standards for the admissibility of expert 
evidence the government offers ought to be heightened to at least 
the level required of the plaintiff in a civil case.3  Indeed, Professor 
Friedman would go further and require even more reliability for 
government expert evidence.4  Second, Professor Friedman suggests 
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 1 Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL 
L. REV.  1071, 1072-75 (2003). 
 2 Id. at 1082-94. 
 3 Id. at 1110; Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1047 (2003); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire 
and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming in Fall 2003).  But see Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of 
Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. __ (forthcoming in Fall 2003). 
 4 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1047. 
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much lower standards for the admissibility of defense expert 
testimony.5 
Adopting such proposals, I believe, risks unintended 
consequences that may worsen, rather than improve, the lot of 
(innocent) criminal defendants.  Changes to the laws of admissibility 
of expert evidence in criminal cases do not occur in a vacuum.  
Rather, they occur against a mosaic of other criminal procedural 
rules and actors, which may be affected by a change to a particular 
rule.  Although it is perhaps impossible to predict the precise effects 
of such changes, I want to suggest two troubling possibilities. 
First, lowering the standards for admitting defense expert 
evidence in criminal cases may well lead to more, not fewer, 
erroneous convictions of criminal defendants.  Admitting more 
defense expert evidence ought to lower the conviction rate, both for 
guilty and innocent defendants.  It is conceivable that this change in 
the conviction rate will give rise to other changes in criminal 
procedure that will ratchet the conviction rate back up.  Such a 
change, however, may result in more inaccurate convictions than 
occurred prior to the initial change.  The overall result would then 
seem to be negative, not positive. 
Second, I want to suggest that there may be good reasons to 
reject the “best evidence” arguments advanced by Professors 
Friedman and Giannelli: courts ought to exclude forensic evidence to 
give the government an incentive to engage in validation research.6  
As they both note, criminal procedure is different than civil 
procedure, and that includes the incentives of the actual actors.  The 
unique considerations of criminal procedure may militate in favor of 
not changing the existing system based on speculation that more 
validation testing might be forthcoming. 
I.  THE EFFECT OF LOWERING THE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
EXPERTS 
Criminal procedure consists of a complex set of rules and 
privileges that, taken together, attempt to strike an appropriate 
balance between protecting defendants from inaccurate convictions 
and allowing society to punish those who have committed crimes.7  
 
 5 See id.  
 6 See id. at 1064-65; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1110; see also Dale Nance, The Best 
Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988). 
 7 There are other possible goals for the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Charles 
Nesson, The Evidence of the Event?: On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (arguing that public acceptance may be a better goal), but 
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But just because the system as a whole seeks to achieve such a balance 
does not mean that individual rights are always set up in a way that 
the particular rule, viewed in isolation, strikes such a balance.  
Rather, the right may weigh against other rights (or the absence of 
other rights) to create the overall balance.  The question with the 
unknown answer is whether altering the rules for the admissibility of 
forensic evidence has unanticipated consequences for this 
equilibrium. 
As Professor Friedman notes, criminal procedure is much 
different than civil procedure, and despite the fact that both criminal 
and civil trials are held under the same rules of evidence, the actual 
application of those rules in civil and criminal trials can be 
dissimilar.8  Perhaps the two most fundamental differences in 
criminal and civil litigation are the privilege against self-incrimination 
and the Double Jeopardy Clause, both of which are very pro-
defendant.9  As courts have interpreted the privilege, it ensures that 
the defendant need never—before or at trial—tell the government or 
the court his side of the story (absent a grant of immunity).10  To 
protect this privilege, the Supreme Court has held that the 
prosecutor cannot argue to the jurors, nor can the trial judge instruct 
them, that they can infer the defendant’s guilt from his silence.11  The 
result of this state of affairs in criminal procedure is that the person 
with the most relevant information about the alleged crime 
frequently never speaks at the trial. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause also influences the shape of 
criminal procedure because it has been interpreted as forbidding the 
government from appealing from a verdict of not guilty.12  As 
Professor Kate Stith has noted, however, there are collateral 
consequences from this right.13  First, there may be a “selection effect” 
that results from the asymmetric nature of the right to appeal in 
 
for purposes of this Comment I will assume agreement on this point. 
 8 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1048-49. 
 9 U.S. CONST. Amend. V. 
 10 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1971). 
 11 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981); see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609 (1965). 
 12 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904); see also Smalis v. 
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986).  Professor Peter Westen has argued that this 
result protects the right of the jury to nullify.  See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of 
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 
1001, 1018 (1980).  For an elaboration of other justifications for the rule, see GEORGE 
C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 113-18 (1998). 
 13 See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the 
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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criminal cases.14  Furthermore, because judges only have a risk of 
reversal from decisions against the defendant, judges may often have 
an incentive to err on the side of the defendant.  In cases involving 
novel issues, though, the tendency may be the reverse: a pro-
government bias.  One need not agree with any of Professor Stith’s 
conclusions to acknowledge that her premise has unsettling 
consequences for criminal justice.  Even if one thinks that the 
asymmetric right to appeal generally favors the government, and not 
the defendant, the results are individual legal rules that differ from 
what otherwise would be normatively preferred.15 
Of course, the common reaction to the distinction between civil 
and criminal litigation is to assume that in criminal litigation the 
government’s job ought to be made harder, and the defendant’s 
easier, than in civil litigation.  For example, in this Symposium 
Professor Friedman argues for heightened admissibility standards for 
the prosecution and lowered admissibility standards for the defense 
in criminal cases.  This argument is based, in part, on his assumption 
that there is a “shared perception that the social cost of an inaccurate 
judgment, given that the defendant is in fact innocent, is many times 
greater than the social cost of an inaccurate judgment given that the 
defendant is in fact guilty.”16  In particular, he argues that the 
possibility of erroneous convictions justifies lenient admissibility of 
expert evidence for the defense.  I believe it is far from clear that the 
rule ought to be tilted in the way he suggests. 
I have argued extensively elsewhere that the “social cost” logic is 
at best incomplete and perhaps wrong.17  This conception of the 
weighing of social costs is most frequently raised, as Professor 
Friedman himself raises it, to justify the “very high” standard of proof 
in criminal cases: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.18  In reality, 
 
 14 Id. at 18-19. 
 15 For instance, some may argue that the rules of search and seizure may be 
warped in a pro-government fashion by the fact that all individuals asserting such 
issues on appeal have been found guilty.  Given that the search and seizure rules 
themselves tend to exclude otherwise relevant evidence of guilt, appellate courts may 
be quite reluctant to overturn a seemingly accurate conviction based on a 
“technicality.”  Were appellate courts to view such cases when brought by plausibly 
innocent defendants, they might be more open to such claims.  This is an argument I 
first heard made by Bill Stuntz. 
 16 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1049. 
 17 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of 
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002). 
 18 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1049.  As Professor Friedman notes, it is also 
frequently raised to justify the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases.  
Id. 
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however, it is quite difficult to justify a high standard of proof using 
such logic.  This is in part because, as Professor Laurence Tribe long 
ago noted, in addition to weighing the social costs of erroneous 
convictions, one must also weigh the social benefits of accurate 
convictions.19  Once social benefits are included in the calculation, it 
becomes much more difficult to decide where to set the standard of 
proof: very high, or perhaps not so high at all.  And this is true 
regardless of one’s overarching theory of criminal law.20 
Outside of the realm of the standard of proof, it is even harder 
to locate criminal justice rules that seek only to avoid the costs of 
erroneous convictions.  If that was the only goal of the criminal 
justice system,21 one might expect, for instance, that the right to pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases would be weighted heavily in favor of 
the defense.  After all, granting defendants extensive discovery rights 
would aid their defense and maximize the chances for an acquittal, 
while restrictive discovery rights for prosecutors would also protect 
defendants.  But this is not what we find.  In many jurisdictions, the 
rights to pre-trial discovery in criminal cases are restrictive for both 
the government and the defense.22  So, for instance, the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure provide for generally symmetric discovery.  
The government must turn over, at the request of the defendant, (a) 
any statements of the defendant, (b) a copy of the defendant’s prior 
record, (c) any documents or tangible things in the possession of the 
government that are either “material to the preparation of the 
defendant’s defense or are intended for use by the government as 
evidence in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the 
defendant,” (d) any reports of examinations or tests that are material 
to the defendant’s defense or are intended to be used by the 
government in its case at trial, and finally (e) a written summary of 
any expert testimony.23  If the defendant requests such evidence, 
though, he must turn over to the government (upon the 
government’s request) evidence that falls into categories (c), (d), and 
 
 19 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision & Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1378-81 (1971). 
 20 See Lillquist, supra note 17, at 130-46. 
 21 Some retributivists might argue that “acquitting the innocent is a constraint on 
achieving the general aim of increasing the common good.”  Lillquist, supra note 17, 
at 141.  But it seems implicit in such claims that other moral commitments to society 
and to victims must also be valued, and perhaps weighed against this constraint.  Id. 
at 142. 
 22 See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 24.01 (4th ed. 2000). 
 23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1). 
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(e).24  Beyond this, the government is obligated under Brady v. 
Maryland25 and its progeny to turn over evidence that, if it were not 
turned over, would create a reasonable probability that the result of 
the proceeding would be different.26  Functionally, this merely means 
that if the government fails to turn over information favorable to the 
defense, the conviction will be vacated only if there is a reasonable 
probability that with the evidence, the defendant might have been 
acquitted.  Finally, the government is obliged, under 18 U.S.C. § 
3500, to turn over any statement by one of its witnesses, but not until 
after the conclusion of the witness’s direct examination.27 
Notably excluded from the evidence that the government must 
turn over are reports written by law enforcement officers or 
government attorneys that do not fall into the categories mentioned 
above, as well as any record of the proceedings before the grand 
jury.28  The latter restriction, when combined with § 3500’s 
requirement that statements by government witnesses need not be 
turned over until after the completion of the direct examination and 
the fact that the federal system, at least, does not require the 
government to disclose its witnesses prior to trial29 ensures that the 
defendant may have little information, prior to trial, as to the case the 
government has against him.30  Of course, in practice, information 
about government witnesses and their statements, even in the federal 
system, are often made available at least a short time before trial.31  
But even when this fact is taken into account, it remains true that, 
unlike civil litigation, the government’s witnesses need not speak to 
the defense.  Thus, the disclosure of information in criminal 
litigation is very different than civil litigation, where the defendant 
and the plaintiff are entitled to vast amounts of information about 
each other’s cases long in advance of trial.32 
 
 24 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1). 
 25 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 26 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).  For an extensive treatment of 
Brady and the cases after it, see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 22, at § 24.04. 
 27 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2000).  The defendant has a similar burden.  See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 26.2. 
 28 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) & (3). 
 29 There is a limited right to the witnesses list prior to trial in capital cases, but 
none otherwise.  18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000). 
 30 Except, of course, for the defendant’s own statements to the government. 
 31 Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jenks Witness Statements: Timing Makes a 
Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 678-92 (1999). 
 32 Professor John Douglass has recently argued that, in fact, discovery rights are 
skewed in favor of the government, once one takes into account the ability of the 
government to obtain information through the use of the grand jury and police 
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Even in states where more liberal discovery is available—for 
instance, in New Jersey—it remains true that the discovery rights of 
the government and the defense are roughly symmetrical.  Thus, in 
New Jersey the defendant is entitled to summaries of his unrecorded 
statements, lists of any persons known to have relevant information 
and statements by such people, as well as police reports, all of which 
might not be available in the federal system.33  But in return, the 
defendant is expected to provide all relevant documents in the 
defendant’s possession; a list of all persons who might be called as 
witnesses, as well as their written statements or any memoranda 
summarizing those statements; and any written statements of the 
government’s witnesses or memoranda summarizing such statements, 
that are in the possession of the defendant.34  In a state such as New 
York, with more limited discovery rights (but perhaps more liberal 
than those in the federal system), the rights also tend to be relatively 
symmetric.35 
Of course, in many jurisdictions it is true that the defendant 
controls discovery rights.  If the defendant does not himself request 
discovery, the government is not entitled to discovery.36  This 
allocation of the triggering power is at least ex ante pro-defendant: 
where the defendant believes he will learn less from the government 
than the government will learn from him, he can avoid this by not 
requesting discovery.  This triggering right, though, is offset by other 
involuntary disclosure requirements.  In the federal system, the 
defendant is required to give notice of an alibi or an insanity 
defense.37  New Jersey’s requirements are even broader: the 
defendant must give notice of alibis and a large number of defenses, 
including renunciation of criminal purpose, ignorance, mistake, and 
insanity, among others.38 
Discovery rules are not the only place where the rules of criminal 
 
officers.  John C. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2097, 2147-50 (2000).  Professor Douglass focuses on federal cases, but his 
observation would appear true even for state systems where grand juries are not used, 
for the government is presumably much better equipped to use its investigative 
agents to collect information before trial than defense counsel, at least in most cases. 
 33 N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(c) (Gann 2003). 
 34 N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(d) (Gann 2003). 
 35 See N.Y. CRIM. P. L. §§ 240.20, 240.30 & 240.45. 
 36 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1) (allowing government discovery only after 
the defendant has requested similar discovery); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b) (permitting 
defendant to waive discovery from government and thereby avoid disclosure 
obligations). 
 37 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 & 12.2. 
 38 N.J. CT. R. 3:12-1 & 3:12-2 (Gann 2003). 
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procedure take a different form than they would if we assumed that 
the rules should generally be designed to avoid erroneous convictions 
with little regard to erroneous acquittals.  For instance, in the realm 
of evidence, one might be surprised to see Federal Rules of Evidence 
413 and 414, which admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct.  After 
all, the general approach of the federal rules, at least in theory, is that 
uncharged misconduct evidence (uncharged in the sense that it is 
not charged in this particular case) is generally inadmissible.39  Of 
course, in practice, such evidence is often admissible, either because 
it is admissible for “other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident,”40 or because it is admitted to 
impeach a defendant who testifies.41  Nonetheless, the clear import of 
Rules 413 and 414 is to increase the admissibility of such evidence in 
sexual assault and child molestation cases.  Couple this with Rule 412, 
which is designed to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior acts, and 
we have a regime that can hardly be called pro-defendant. 
What I hope these examples illustrate is that particular rules in 
criminal litigation are often far less protective of defendants than we 
might predict if the only goal of criminal justice was to avoid 
inaccurate convictions.  For that very reason, many would argue that 
these rules, as well as others, are normatively unsound.  I take away a 
different conclusion, though.  Many of the rules of criminal 
procedure, in particular the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the double jeopardy rules, already heavily favor the defendant.  In 
fact, it may well be that such rights and privileges are too skewed in 
the favor of the defendant.42  Once we recall this background, it may 
be far more easy to understand why so many other rights in criminal 
practice and procedure do not favor defendants, at least to the extent 
that some would advocate.43 
What I have said so far suggests that the rules governing the 
prosecution and defense of criminal cases tend to strike a balance 
between the criminal justice system’s need for accuracy and its need 
 
 39 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
 40 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 41 FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 42 For arguments pro and con as to the privilege against self-incrimination, see 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in THE PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 181, 182-83 & nn. 9 & 10 
(1997). 
 43 This is similar to Bill Stuntz’s observation that the rules of criminal procedure 
themselves often influence the substantive criminal law.  See William J. Stuntz, 
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 1, 7-19 (1996). 
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for convictions.  If this is true, the rule proposed by Professor 
Friedman—liberal admissibility of defense expert testimony—has the 
potential to upset that balance.  This is because such a standard is 
likely to lower the number of convictions, but, I think, unlikely to do 
so in a way that enhances accuracy.  Imagine for the moment that at 








Convicted 90 1 
Acquitted 10 9 
 
In this model, we have ninety defendants who are accurately 
convicted and ten who are erroneously acquitted, along with one 
defendant who is inaccurately convicted and nine who are correctly 
acquitted.44  The precise numbers do not matter; what is important is 
that we recognize that at present there are defendants who fit into all 
four categories. 
What is the effect of a rule of liberal admission of defense expert 
evidence?  The overall number of convictions should go down (there 
is little reason to think that it will rise, and perhaps even less reason 
to think that the effect is neutral).  Furthermore, there is little reason 
to believe that such a change will improve accuracy overall.  Assuming 
that at present the number of erroneous convictions is relatively low, 
any reduction in the conviction rate should actually decrease accuracy.  
For instance, we might imagine that the result of such a change in 







 44 The actual allocation of guilty and innocent defendants at trial is difficult to 
know.  The conviction rate of approximately 80% in federal cases suggests, but by no 
means proves, that about four times as many factually guilty defendants are tried 
than factually innocent defendants.  Lillquist, supra note 17, at 101 n.35.  The 
numbers in the table assume a slightly higher number of factually guilty defendants, 
but a roughly equivalent conviction rate (82.7%).  This reflects an assumption that 
there are presently more erroneous acquittals than convictions, something else we 
cannot know to be true. 







Convicted 75 0 
Acquitted 25 10 
 
The net result is a lowering in the number of guilty defendants 
who are convicted.  First, it is not clear that, as a social matter, this is a 
justifiable trade-off.  One common assertion is that it is better that ten 
guilty persons go free than one innocent person be convicted.45  But 
in the above example, fifteen guilty persons are going free to spare 
one innocent person; is that a trade-off we would accept?  At best, the 
commentators would appear to disagree.46  Of course, the numbers I 
have given are completely speculative.  In reality, the ratio of guilty to 
innocent persons acquitted as a result of this change could either be 
below 10:1 or higher than 10:1.  But the fact that we do not know the 
answer to this question should give us pause before concluding that 
this is a desirable change. 
Second, even if this turns out to be a good trade-off, the 
resulting overall level of conviction may be socially undesirable.47  If 
so, then the criminal justice system should react to Professor 
Friedman’s change with another rule that will ratchet the number of 
accurate convictions back up to ninety.  What we cannot know in 
advance is how this rule change will affect the number of not guilty 
defendants who are convicted.  While we can hope that the number 
stays at zero, it is also possible that it goes up to two or three.  Thus, 




 45 See Lillquist, supra note 17, at 105. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Of course, this assumes that a goal of the system is to obtain some number of 
convictions.  Certainly deterrence theorists would accept this, and consequentialists 
more generally.  Even many retributivists would probably accept this as a goal, 
although not the only goal, and perhaps not as a goal to be valued in some 
circumstances. 
It does not follow from this premise, however, “that most defendants are guilty.”  
Friedman, supra note 3, at 1050.  In fairness, I am not sure if Professor Friedman 
directs this response at Professor Park or myself, but nothing in my observations here 
presuppose the guilt of the defendant.  My assumption simply is that some 
defendants are guilty, some defendants are not guilty, and that at least one goal of 
the criminal justice system should be to distinguish between the two groups. 







Convicted 90 3 
Acquitted 10 7 
 
If so, the net effect of Professor Friedman’s proposal is to 
increase, not decrease, the number of innocent defendants who will 
be convicted. 
Of course, I do not know that any of these things I have 
suggested will come to pass.  But I think they are just as plausible as 
assuming that the overall effect will be positive.  Against that 
background, it seems to me unwise to liberalize the admissibility of 
defense expert testimony. 
II.  THE LIMITS OF BEST EVIDENCE 
The other suggestion made by Professors Friedman and 
Giannelli is that the admission of some government expert evidence 
ought to be made more difficult on a “best evidence” principle: the 
evidence should be excluded to ensure that the government will 
undertake the proper validation testing of the evidence.48  As applied 
to evidence that is presently admissible, I believe this suggestion is 
problematic.49 
One difficulty with such an argument is that it confuses and 
conflates the incentives of the government and those of the 
government’s agents: prosecutors and, to a lesser extent here, the 
police.  As commentators have noted, the incentives of both these 
groups do not always neatly match those of the government more 
generally.50  In particular, prosecutors’ goals may be a combination of 
a desire to reduce their own workloads, balanced by an ambition to 
further their own careers.51  Their incentives to seek validation of 
forensic evidence may be weak compared to their incentives to simply 
shift resources to prosecuting other cases.  After all, seeking 
validation testing would require the exercise of time and resources 
 
 48 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1064-65; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1110. 
 49 I take no position on whether such a rule might make sense for forensic 
evidence that has not yet been ruled admissible. 
 50 See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000); see also William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). 
 51 See Stuntz, supra note 50, at 535, 543. 
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for an uncertain outcome, whereas simply altering their caseloads 
would require much less risk.  This does not mean no validation 
testing would occur, just that low-level prosecutors are not likely to be 
the parties pushing for it to occur. 
To understand why this may be so, consider first the cases in 
which the government will generally seek to admit forensic evidence.  
Not all crimes are investigated in the same way.  So, for instance, the 
government places relatively little effort into apprehending the 
perpetrators of most property crimes, but far more resources into 
apprehending murderers.  As a result, there are far higher clearance 
rates in homicide cases than in property crime cases.52  It would seem 
to follow naturally that forensic evidence should be no different than 
the other aspects of criminal investigation: much less resources ought 
to be invested in low-level cases.  The result is that we would imagine 
that such evidence plays a much larger role in murder and sexual 
assault cases than it does in burglary cases.53 
In addition, as Professor Slobogin notes, the type of forensic 
evidence that the government typically seeks to admit in a criminal 
case focuses on identity: tying the defendant to the crime.54  Thus, 
forensic evidence is typically used in serious criminal cases where 
identity of the perpetrator is a contested issue.  Excluding such 
forensic evidence on a “best evidence” principle may give prosecutors 
an incentive to move resources in other directions: toward cases 
without identity issues or to less serious crimes.55  This means that the 
greater effect of the exclusion of forensic evidence would be to upset 
the selection of cases for prosecution, rather than increasing 
validation testing. 
Of course, top-level prosecutors—attorneys-general and district 
attorneys—may have a more direct incentive to be concerned by the 
exclusion of forensic evidence than their subordinates.  If low-level 
prosecutors are more likely to avoid cases involving forensic evidence 
in the face of longer odds in winning convictions, the result should 
be lower conviction rates in such cases.  Furthermore, the very cases 
in which this will occur are those that are the most likely to be salient 
 
 52 SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 132-34 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 53 So, for instance, one study reported that in 1985, fingerprint evidence led to 
an arrest in only 300 out of 126,028 burglary cases.  Id at 139. 
 54 Slobogin, supra note 3. 
 55 In state systems, the second move might be less likely, because prosecutors 
there are expected to prosecute such crimes.  But in the federal system it is a 
plausible outcome, because prosecutors there generally have more freedom to pick 
cases.  See generally Stuntz, supra note 50, at 570. 
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to the public—murder and rape cases—because those are the cases in 
which such evidence is used.56  The top-level prosecutor, particularly 
if she is elected, might have good reason to push for changes that 
would make such forensic evidence admissible, so that the conviction 
rate will rise. 
The difficulty is that top-level prosecutors should have (at least) 
two possible strategies they could pursue to achieve this goal.  First, 
they might request that the legislature fund additional validation 
research.  Alternatively, though, they could simply lobby for changes 
in state evidence law that might make such evidence admissible, 
despite the decision of state courts.  There is evidence to suggest that 
the second path is the more likely (but far less desirable) one. 
In the field of evidence, the basic premise is that judges decide 
the admissibility of evidence.57  If the judiciary had the sole power to 
decide the admissibility of forensic evidence, then top-level 
prosecutors might seek the first path (validation testing) because 
there would be little hope that the second path (rule alteration) 
would pay off.  After all, lobbying for rule changes to the same judges 
who made the rule in the first place does not seem too likely to 
succeed.  In practice, however, the authority for setting the rules of 
evidence in the first place is often divided between the judiciary and 
the legislature.  For instance, under present federal law, the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Conference have the responsibility for 
prescribing the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal 
system.58  But that power is limited—at least practically—by a 
congressional veto: the Supreme Court must submit such proposed 
rules to Congress, and Congress can, and has, taken steps to block 
the implementation of certain rules and to even impose alternative 
rules.59  Perhaps the most prominent example involved the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  After the Supreme 
Court promulgated the original draft of the rules in 1972 and 
submitted them to Congress, Article V of those rules (the evidentiary 
privilege rules) were rejected in their entirety, and Congress 
subsequently enacted the other Rules after rewriting many of them.60 
 
 56 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 57 FED R. EVID. 104(a). 
 58 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 & 2073 (2000); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The 
Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846 (2002). 
 59 On the requirement to submit proposed rules to Congress, see 28 U.S.C. § 
2074 (2000). 
 60 See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 88 (2002); see 
also Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 772-77 (2002); Scallen, supra note 
 1202 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1189 
At the state level, the authority to decide the rules of evidence is 
also mixed.  In some jurisdictions, the rules of evidence are code-
based: passed by state legislatures and signed into law by the 
Governor.61  In other states, the rules of evidence are still primarily 
judge-made, either through judicially promulgated rules of evidence 
or through common-law decision-making.62  Even in places where 
judges retain primary authority for setting forth the rules of evidence, 
the legislature may have the power to enact specific rules.63 
Recognizing that the judiciary does not unilaterally decide the 
rules of evidence, but rather is either part of a cooperative process 
with the legislature, or even simply the recipient of legislatively 
constructed rules, raises the real possibility that top-level prosecutors 
may prefer to lobby the legislature for rule changes rather than for 
funds for validation testing of forensic evidence.  This is because the 
payoff from a rule change is both immediate and definitely positive, 
whereas the payoff from validation testing is both remote and 
uncertain.  So, for instance, legislation mandating the admissibility of 
fingerprint evidence would instantaneously make such evidence 
admissible.  Validation testing of fingerprint evidence, however, 
would make such evidence admissible only after a lengthy period of 
time for study, and even then there would be no guarantee that the 
evidence would be, in fact, validated.  With these very different 
payoffs, it would seem that prosecutors have a strong incentive to pick 
the rule-change strategy.  Thus, it is not surprising that even today, 
when defendants are increasingly mounting attacks on the 
admissibility of forensic evidence, the Department of Justice has 
remained slow to fund validation testing.64 
 
58, at 854.  On the history of the rules as a whole, see 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5006, pp. 106-
09 (1977).  For a contemporaneous view, see James Wm. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, 
Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974).  For a broader history of the 
evidence rules, see Scallen, supra note 58, at 845-56. 
 61 In 1984, Professor Margaret Berger reported that at least eleven states had 
passed evidentiary statutes. Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining 
and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256 nn. 4, 7 & 8 (1984). 
 62 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE – A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 4.3.1 (2002). 
 63 There appear to be some jurisdictions in which the judiciary alone, as a result 
of state constitutional law, has the power to determine at least some rules of 
evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ky. 1987); 
Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408-09 (N.J. 1950).  Even in these jurisdictions, 
though, the judiciary may defer to legislative decisions in some circumstances.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Reneer, 724 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ky. 1987); Passaic County Prob. 
Officers’ Ass’n v. County of Passaic, 374 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1977). 
 64 Margaret Berger, Remarks at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium, Expert 
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Furthermore, past experience suggests that legislatures will be 
willing to respond to such lobbying.  For instance, the privilege rules 
proposed for the Federal Rules of Evidence were removed as the 
result of heavy post-Watergate lobbying.65  The history of the federal 
sexual crimes rules is similarly instructive.  Rules 413, 414, and 415 
were created by Congress as part of the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.66  Under that act, the Judicial 
Conference was to submit to Congress within 150 days of the passage 
of the act a report responding to the new rules.  In the event that the 
Judicial Council’s recommendations differed from the rules as set 
forth in the act, the act’s rules were to become effective 150 days after 
the report, unless, of course, Congress took other action.  As it 
happened, the Judicial Conference urged rejection and/or 
modification of the rules.  In particular, the Judicial Conference 
believed that the rules would lead to the admission of unfairly 
prejudicial evidence and would result in “mini-trials” on the alleged 
prior acts.67  Congress, though, took no action (probably because the 
rules themselves were politically popular)68, which resulted in the 
implementation of the rules.  I am not suggesting that the rules were 
normatively justifiable.  Certainly the weight of academic commentary 
and the near-unanimous opinion of three separate Advisory 
Committees (Evidence, Civil Rules, and Criminal Rules) suggest that 
they were not.69  But the politically responsive branches—Congress 
and the Executive (here represented by the Department of Justice)—
supported the rules.70  As with the history of Article V, this story 
implies that Congress—and probably other legislatures as well—will 
be sensitive to complaints of evidence law made by law enforcement 
groups. 
Imagine for a moment, that Judge Pollak had stuck to his 
 
Admissibility: Keeping Gates, Goals and Promises (February 21, 2003). 
 65 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63; see also Scallen, supra note 58, at 854. 
 66 Scallen, supra note 58, at 855-56. 
 67 Report Submitted to Congress in Accordance with Section 320935 of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, reproduced in FED. R. EVID. 
413, historical notes (West 2002). 
 68 See Paul C. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending to the 
Past and Pretending to the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 841 n.59 (2002) (noting that 
the rules were enacted “to give the appearance that those who supported [them] 
were tough[] on the kind of crimes of concern to voters”). 
 69 But see Roger Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: 
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995) 
(supporting rules). 
 70 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and 
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994). 
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decision in United States v. Llera Plaza,71 limiting the testimony of the 
government’s fingerprint examiners and forbidding them from 
opining that a particular print is from a particular person.72  Even if 
other federal judges did not follow the decision, or if it was eventually 
overturned on appeal, it seems to me at least possible, if not likely, 
that Congress would have quickly passed legislation entitled 
something like the Latent Fingerprint Admissibility Act of 2002.  The 
Justice Department strongly opposed the initial decision in Llera Plaza 
and would no doubt have lobbied on behalf of such a bill.  Given the 
recent success of the Justice Department in achieving other changes 
to criminal procedure rules, most prominently in the USA PATRIOT 
Act, I believe there is good reason to assume such an act would pass.  
More importantly, such an act might well be worse than what we have 
now. 
Furthermore, there is good reason to suspect that, at least at the 
present time, calls to eliminate many other types of forensic evidence 
might meet a similar fate.  Although I am not currently aware of any 
data on the issue—and thus my speculation is no doubt inadmissible 
under Daubert—I believe that there are good anecdotal reasons to 
speculate that society as a whole feels comfortable with much forensic 
evidence.  After all, two of the most popular current shows on 
television are C.S.I. and C.S.I.: Miami, which both rely heavily for plot 
development on some of the very types of forensic evidence that this 
Symposium finds objectionable.  Against this background, it is quite 
plausible to believe that Congress (and state legislatures) would have 
little problem overruling other decisions excluding forensic evidence 
that is presently admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
There appears to be little debate that the existing law of expert 
admissibility in criminal cases is flawed.  The real question is how to 
fix it.  I suspect that at least some judicially-created solutions are likely 
to fail, because their negative consequences are likely to outweigh 
their benefits.  That does not mean, though, that reform is not 
possible, particularly if carefully crafted.  To achieve this goal, I 
believe that close attention must be paid to the likely consequences of 
such actions.  The best way to avoid legislative responses to decisions 
to exclude forensic evidence may be to obtain popular opinion in 
favor of such changes.  Thus, the proper parties to whom such 
 
 71 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 
2002). 
 72 Id. at *18. 
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arguments should be first made are not practitioners, academics, or 
judges, but rather the public at large.  Publicizing the ineffective 
nature of a type of forensic evidence will have far more impact on its 
admissibility than legal discussion about the proper way to apply 
Daubert, particularly if alterations to the existing structure of forensic 
evidence admissibility have the unintended consequences I have 
suggested. 
Therefore, I believe it is no coincidence that the one place 
where forensic evidence has been successfully challenged, 
handwriting evidence, is the same place where Professors Denbeaux, 
Risinger and Sacks have created “an academic assembly of all the 
data.”73  Only by undertaking similar assemblies in other fields are 
challenges to admissibility likely to be successful. 
 
 73 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 138 (2000). 
